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Book Reviews
THE PROSPECTS FOR REVOLUTION: A STUDY OF RIOTS, CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE, AND INSURRECTION IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICA. By Ralph W. Conant.t New York: Harper's

Magazine Press, 1971. Pp. xi, 290. $8.95.
The Prospects for Revolution is not a manual for would be "Che
Gueveras," nor for that matter is it an outline of anticipated events
leading to what the title suggests, namely, revolution. It is rather a
study of selected events which took place in the '60's and which, as
perceived by the author, led him to the optimistic conclusion that
there are no prospects for revolution in the foreseeable future.
The author, Dr. Conant, is the Director of the Institute for Urban
Studies at the University of Houston, President of the newly established Southwest Center for Urban Research in Houston, and formerly
Associate Director of the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence
at Brandeis University. He wrote this book for a general audience "and
sought to give it a deserving patina of scholarship. The author reveals
a disciplinary penchant toward sociology and social psychology, but,
interestingly enough, he allows his intuition and limited personal experiences to play a big role in the perception of the issues which uriderlie dissent-related movements.
In the author's Preface he acknowledges that: "Almost all of what
I know about the younger generation has come from my own children
Beverlie, Lisa and Jonathan and from their many friends who have
opened their minds and hearts to me these past few years."' This
candid admission of a tuned-in father is apparently also the cause for
his optimistic conclusions that the future holds no grim prospects for
revolution, which he states in these words: "If I am optimistic about
2
the future, it is mostly because of them."
The author relies on studies and research performed at Brandeis,
while he was there, and uses some of these case studies and data to
document his observations. Like all advocates of a particular point
t Director of the Institute for Urban Studies at the University of Houston; President
of the Southwest Center for Urban Research in Houston; formerly Associate Director of
the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University.

1.

R. CONANT, THE PROSPECTS FOR REVOLUTION, Xi,

2.

Id.

134

(1971) [hereinafter cited as

CONANT].

Book Reviews
of view, Dr. Conant dips into that big boiling cauldron of facts called
history and selectively assembles those most likely to support his proposition. In that connection, one cannot fail to notice the glaring absence of reference to the Eisenhower Commission (the President's
Commission on Violence), which is not even cited, while references
to earlier reports such as the Kerner Report (the President's National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders) are scant.
Two general observations must be made at the outset, namely, that:
the ideological and philosophical implications of the subjects of civil
disobedience, riots, insurrection and revolution are treated very superficially; and their relationship to law, theoretical or applied, is largely
oversimplified. Neither one of these two aspects received the treatment
or coverage warranted by their significance. That is not to say,, however,
that the book does not touch upon these questions. It refers to the 1967
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, and even though now four years old, many of its findings are
still valid, but the functioning of the machinery of criminal justice,
whether proper or improper, is not explained. Over generalized conclusions are drawn from a limited foundation, and this tends to leave
the uninitiated reader in a quandary about the legal process, its intended purposes, and actual realizations. Questions of political ideology,
social philosophy, their interaction, and clashes between diverse and
divergent ideologies, are practically untouched.
In every one of the eight chapters of this book, the author starts by
stating a premise, and assuming its validity, proceeds logically to his
given conclusion. This sound Aristotelian methodology is, however,
only valid if one accepts the assumed premise as true and considers all
other factors to remain unchanged and unchanging, so that the progression of the contemplated events can flow unaffected by unforeseen
developments likely to affect the projected sequence and course of
events.
The first chapter is entitled The Nature of Civil Protest. In it the
author refers, among others, to such questions as "the established order," "the system," and "individual rights and equalitarian values."
But he does not discuss the "nature" of civil protest, although he uses
the word as part of his title, nor for that matter does he discuss the
significance of rights, values, order, and system.3 Such unexplained
3. See Allen, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order, and Smith, The Legitimacy of
Civil Disobedience as a Legal Concept, in M. BASSIOUNI, THE LAW oF DISSENT AND RIOTS
(1971), at 121 and 167..
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concepts tend, therefore, to become mere cliches. The philosophical
basis of dissent and the ideologies that nurture any of the manifestations of dissent and disaffection are expressed in terms of a conflict
between the condition of stability aspired to by a dominant group
within society and another group for whom such stability would be
at its expense. The argument is certainly not novel whether it is
couched in Marxist terms of class struggle or in Rousseau's "Social
Contract" theory of socio-economic and political justice, but it is clearly
insufficient to explain such complex questions to a general audience.
He considers interaction among pluralistic groups in a single political
structure which has a democratic-egalitarian system as a safety valve
which will ultimately preserve that very system from self-destruction.
He attempts to distinguish between black activism and youth activism
in terms of individual self-identification, which he sees as the difference
in their opportunity to reach a position of power within the "system."
What is at stake, however, is not only accessibility to enter the system
and reach its decision-making level, but rather the functional structure
of that system. The author's observation is very true with respect to personal motivation and drive, i.e., whites can get in the system and reach
positions of power much more easily than blacks, hence the white activists' expectations are always more stimulated than his black counterpart activities. It must be noted, however, that the motivating force
of blacks is not only the limitations placed on their opportunity to
reach power (whatever that really means in America today), but there
is another factor at stake, namely, the deterrence factor which is an
equally, if not a more powerful motivating force. That deterrence
factor lies, among others, in the social process of stigmatization; whites
can drift out of it with equal ease-all it would take may be a haircut,
a suit and tie, but blacks remain black, and cannot move that freely
into and out of the established conventional bounds of society. 4 That
more than anything else remains the most distinguishing factor between
black and white activists, and warrants the conclusion of de facto racism.
Nowhere in this chapter are theories of dissent and civil disobedience discussed, and the reader is left with the impression that they
are the sort of thing one does when one feels disaffected, a sort of
"whatever turns you on" type of behavior.
In Chapters Two and Three, the author seeks to distinguish civil
4. See Bassiouni and Fisher, The Changing Times: A Basic Survey of Dissent in Amer
ican Society, in THE LAW OF DISSENT AND RIOTS, supra note 3 at 25 et seq.
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disobedience, rioting, insurrection and revolution. The idea is certainly very laudable, as clarification of the meaning of these terms is
very useful in perceiving their actual significance and societal responses
to their occurrence. One is tempted to think, however, that the distinction is more one of means than of end, but the author views it more
as the converse. Whether means or end, each one of these conditions
of disaffection is a link in the same chain. Revolution is the changing
of conditions contemplated by its proponents who are disenchanted
with a status quo which is to be overturned by swift radical means. Revolution, however, is not always for the sake of radical change or for that
matter necessarily in the best interest of people. Often, as George
Bernard Shaw said: "Revolutions have never lightened the burden of
tyranny: they have only shifted it to another shoulder." 5
Revolution, furthermore, is often nothing more than accelerated
evolution. To distinguish revolutionary typology is often a matter of
ideology not only of means used or contemplated. Dr. Conant's conclusion is that revolution in America is not forthcoming because the system has the flexibility that allows it to achieve peaceful evolution and
thus avert the prospects of revolution. In this context, he echoes what
the late President Kennedy expressed so aptly: "Those who make peaceful evolution impossible, make violent revolution inevitable." 6 What
is not clear in Conant's thesis is exactly how this flexibility manifests
itself in the political process and what constitutional and legal foundations support it.7 This reviewer agrees with the author's ultimate conclusion, but can not agree with some of the distinctions made between
civil disobedience, rioting, insurrection and revolution. The premises
chosen by the author are presented as absolute and unequivocal, but
are indeed quite arguable; one example is: "The civil disobedient always acts within the general frame of established authority. ' 8 This reflects a Martin Luther King approach, subsequently expounded by
former Associate Justice Abe FortasY Consider, however, in contrast to
that view the use of civil disobedience by Gandhi and his followers as a
revolutionary device to attain the independence of India from its
5. Preface to THE REVOLUTIONIST'S HANDBOOK.
6. Inaugural speech at the meeting of Organization of American States, Punta del Este,
Uruguay (1961).
7. See Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, in THE LAW OF DISSENT AND RIOTS,
supra note 3, at 67.
8.
9.

CONANT, 15.
FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968).
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British colonial rulers. 10 In fact, when a people have no available
means to accomplish a violent revolution, their only alternative weapon
is civil disobedience and in this case, they seek to overturn established
authority and not to operate within its framework as the author affirms.
Conant observes that the real dilemma inherent in civil disobedience
stems from the fundamental tension between the individual and society, while in fact the cleavage is between the individual and the established authoritative power structure. An authoritative power
structure does not necessarily have to be the society in which the individual is a member, but could be one in which he is completely or
partially alien. Consider the case of blacks, Indians, and Chicanos in
America; blacks in South Africa, Namibia, and Rhodesia; Palestinians
in Israel; or any national or minority group in colonial regimes, even
political minorities under dictatorships and oligarchies. The issue furthermore is not only political, in the sense of a group's participation in
the political decision-making process of an established power structure,
but also economic, social, religious, and psychological. All of these factors contribute to the changing or divergent ideologies which underscore any protest movement whether or not that movement elects to
engage in civil disobedience, riots, insurrection or revolution. Choice,
however, is not always the case. Often such disaffected groups drift into
any of these conditions because of the pressure of external circumstances
or even because of an unforeseen combination of external pressuring
factors and limited choice of action options.
The treatment given to questions of law and morality is simplistic
in terms of formulating jurisprudential notions, but particularly weak
in regard to the problems of administration of criminal justice in urban
America." The author draws a distinction between challenging the
interpretation of a law and the ultimate purposes of law, even though
the distinction is invalid in positivist jurisprudence wherein a rose by
any other name is still a rose and a violation of the law is no less
justifiable because of the motives of the actor.' 2 He moralizes legal
disobedience by claiming that its perpetrator is willing to pay its consequences by being punished. 13 However, an intentional violator
of the law whose conduct is ideologically motivated is undeterred by
10.

M.K. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE, KAMARAPPA, ed. (1961).
See Bassiouni, A Selective Annotated Bibliography, in THE LAW OF DISSENT AND
RIOTS, supra note 3, at 439.

11.

12. Bassiouni, The Ideologically Motivated Offender and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 217 (1969).
13. Supra note 9.
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punishment, and seeks either to have that law declared invalid and
thus avoid punishment or to be punished in order to become a symbol,
a martyr, to galvanize other adherents to the cause. This is a basic
strategy of radicals, designed to polarize people. It is absurd to believe
that a politically motivated dissenter breaches the law and seeks its
punishment or accepts it as the price for his conduct when he often,
if not always, rejects that law, the system that enforces it, or both. This
is the fallacy in Fortas' reasoning which seems to be carried in Conant's
book. The author's approach to selective moral choice of what law to
obey or what law to disobey, because as he sees it, law is neither moral
nor absolute, is misleading because it provides no basis for the choice,
i.e., why obey, why disobey and how does distinguish between both?
Certainly no legal system could survive this summerhill-type approach.
A distinction does, however, exist in legal philosophy, but the author
fails to identify it. 1 4 When he refers to the Nuremberg trials, for ex-

ample, he refers to disobedience as "a moral and patriotic duty,"'15 ignoring that it was held also to be a legal duty because of the existence
of higher legal duties that morally and legally require disobedience of
16
certain types of superior orders.
Concerning riots, he defines them as "spontaneous outbursts" and
"unpremeditated outbursts,"'17 which may be true in some cases, but
such a generalization is inapplicable to many such instances. He describes the riots in Harlem, '64; Watts, '65; Newark, '67; Detroit, '61
(ignoring Chicago, '67) in these words:
All riots stem from intense conflict within the value systems that
stabilize the social and political processes of a community. The
Ghetto riots of the 1960's in the United States are a concrete example of a group attempt to restructure values and to clarify social relationships in a short time by extraordinary methods.' 8
The author would have benefited greatly in this area from the Kerner
Report's findings and certainly from many accounts which relate these
outbursts essentially to economic reasons which have their roots in
racism. One might add that the F.B.I. and local police authorities reported that in most of these events there was also some purposeful insti14. See Allen, supra note 3.
15. CONANT, 20.
16. See Q. Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (1947), and
more recently, T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIET NAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1970).
17. CONANT, 22.

18.

Id. at 23.
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gation or at least some fanning by intentional activist strategy. In any
event, the man, woman or youth in the streets of Watts, Newark, Detroit and Chicago was not there, whether by choice or lack of choice,
because of his desire to "stabilize the social and political process," as
the author claims. Rather, he was there because of bread and butter
issues without which basic human dignity cannot be attained.
The author describes a riot as consisting of four stages, and his classification is very sustainable save for the absence of a planning or
deliberation stage which he excludes a priori from constituting part
of riots. His conclusions do not differ too much from contemporary
thinking that the police often create an event likely to trigger massive
popular reaction, and success in quelling a disturbance depends on
good community relations and often a withdrawal of the police from
the scene. 19 This position is, of course, very arguable but cannot be
advanced as more than a theory, not a scientific certainty. The riot,
to Dr. Conant, is a symptom of social upheaval more in the nature
of a challenge and a threat to the status quo than a politically or
ideologically based movement with long-range objectives. He points out,
in apparent contradiction, that it is distinguishable from insurrection
and revolution according to the "scope of their associated social movements. 20° Thus, he concludes that they are fundamentally different
social phenomena.
Insurrection is defined as the threshold of revolution and is distinguished from revolution in that it does not seek overthrow of
the government, but insurrectionists are labelled "temporary revolutionary" 21 at best, who are less organized and disciplined than the
true revolutionary. Surprisingly, he considers the insurrectionist as an
individual who has "participated in some form of criminal or fringecriminal activity, '22 but no empirical data supports this finding, and
somehow the history of revolutionary and insurrectionist movements
does not necessarily bear out these assertions. The truth of the matter
is that whenever an insurrectionist movement succeeds, it is called
revolutionary and receives its share of praise, but when it fails it is
invariably relegated to the role of insurrection and its adherents labelled criminals. While the author sought to make valuable distinc19.
253.
20.
21.
22.
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tions between these movements on a basis other than ultimate success,
he nonetheless leads one to the mistake of confusing this latter assertion.
He earnestly seeks to bring an orderly scientific distinction between
the two categories of movements.
The observations the author makes concerning the motivations of
insurrectionists and revolutionaries are incisive and display in-depth
understanding of that type of person's self-image and self-identification
process.
When discussing black leadership, he reiterates some known arguments but presents them cogently and in a manner which reflects
some experience with black sentiments. His remarks about leadership
"co-optation," however true, fail to show that America's white power
structure was eager to find black leaders and even to help make them.
That is symptomatic of the American political process which deals
with power blocks through structure based leadership likely to command group compliance with their decisions. The author neglects this
facet and still looks at the process more from the vantage point of
social psychology than of the social structure. Such idealism lacks the
dimension of Realpolitik. Of great interest is his classification of leadership as: prestige leader; Uncle Tom; token leader; community organizers; and the new Negro. In this instance, he brings an interesting
characterization of leadership as perceived by the peer group. He concludes very astutely that: "The effective leaders of the future are those
now emerging who have somehow escaped both the psychological damage of subjugation and self-destructive identification with the white,
who value themselves and are governed by standards of their own
choice."2
In an attempt to clarify conflicts within the black community
and the relations between black and white communities, the author moves to interstructure conflict and discusses issues of schooling,
bussing and police activities. The approach is the best suited to the
existing situation, but his lack of mastery of criminal justice problems
did not permit him to refer to some crucial questions, such as, selective law enforcement and community based control of police. When
referring to black activist leadership in its relationship to its own peer
group, he reverts to a different type of analysis and looks at the dual
if not almost schizophrenic role of the black leader. This role forces
him to shift tone, style and rhetoric depending upon his audience,
23.

Id. at 105.
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concluding that when dealing with blacks, the activist leader is deeply
conservative, 24 due to "fear of white reprisals," 25 but that is a very
debatable reason, even though the conclusion is plausible. The strategy of "white resistance" is viewed in the context of the flight to the
suburb movement. This may be termed as reverse civil disobedience
whereby whites grind to a slow movement the process of racial integration. The conclusion would be to accelerate the process which is already in motion and not to change it by revolution. In this context,
legal protests spur the political center and prevent reactionaries from
succeeding in their "slow-down" efforts. The strategies of white resistance he outlines are: "scatteration" and "metropolitan planning," 26
and as to both he presents cogent arguments showing how these devices
are used to preserve white hegemony. This explanation, true in part,
is, however, dangerously oversimplified as it tends to brand all white
suburbanites as racists, even though the author does not make such an
assertion. The many reasons for such a process should have been better
explained particularly in light of low and middle income housing
projects in suburbs. What is of great significance is the problem of
metropolitan transportation which, if it existed, would have eliminated
the barriers of distance and de facto segregation in suburban employment and job markets. The elimination of this hurdle could ultimately
circumvent the devices used by conscious white discriminatory strategies. In the final analysis, the number one question is economic and its
primacy deserved a more adequate treatment. The concluding words
of the author are reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln's famous: "You
can fool some of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all
of the people all of the time." In Dr. Conant's words:
In this turbulent democracy, the truth will out; and the conscience of the nation, writ large in the Constitution, will right the
errors of temporary leaders whose designs cannot endure unless
they are just.
The issues which constitute the basis of contemporary social
unrest in the United States can ultimately be resolved within the
formal political structures of the nation; for these structures have,
on the whole, proved to be receptive to change when guided by
the ideals of the national Constitution. No little proof of that
hope is that the catalytic forces that have brought the issues to
24. Id. at 127.
25.

Id.

26.

Id. at 146.
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center-stage were generated outside the formal structures
by a dis27
sident citizenry dedicated to constitutional values.
Despite the seemingly critical analysis of this book, it is more in the
spirit of the French saying: "Qui trop embrasse mal treint,"-he
who seeks to embrace too much does not hug well. Dr. Conant's most
valuable classifications and distinctions are submerged by his attempts
to embrace many related fields in which he has little mastery. This
leads the reviewer and eventually the reader to notice more critically
the weaknesses of his analysis, but hopefully its strength shall not be
overlooked because of it.
M. Cherif Bassiouni*

UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MucKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND NISQUALLY INDIANS. By Ameri-

can Friends Service Committee. Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1970. Pp. 232. $5.95 (Cloth), $2.50
(Paperback).
One's initial reaction to the title is likely to be jocular disinterest.
The reader who seriously completes the first several pages will find
his disinterest dispelled. The reader who seriously completes the book
will find himself enlightened, instructed and possessed of more diverse
interests than he brought to the book.
Uncommon Controversy is an uncommon book in that it is not the
product of a single or even several authors. In the Introduction, Walter Taylor, former National Indian Program Representative for the
American Friends Service Committee, explains that the book evolved
as an aggregation of many reports and papers written by national and
international students and researchers in various areas which are popularly communized and called ecology. However, whatever diversity
its progenitors may have had is absent from their progeny, which is
cohesive, well documented and well ordered.
The uncommon controversy swirls around the use, development and
conservation of fish and fishing rights principally in the states of Wash27. Id. at 224.
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; 1971 Visiting Professor of Law,
New York University School of Law; 1970 Fulbright Hays Visiting Professor of International Criminal Law, University of Freiburg, Germany.

1'43

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 10: 143, 1971

ington and Oregon. It admits of many fomenters, among them: Indians, principally Muckleshoot, Puyallup, and Nisqually-river tribes
located near the South end of Puget Sound; commercial fishermen;
sport fishermen; other river users; conservationists; governmental
agencies and officials; politicians; civil libertarians; philosophers; social scientists; thoughtful citizens; and numbers of lawyers.
The roots of the controversy lie, according to the authors, in failure
of the participants to comprehend diverse cultures;' and in the white
man's past and present presumed premise that he knows what is best
for Indians.
The analysis of the problems and issues involved begins with the
contention that before the Europeans arrived in North America, the
richest inhabitants were the Northwest Coast Indians, and the basis
of their economy and lives was the salmon. Following a sketch of tribal
life and customs, the book reviews various incursions into tribal
lands by hunters, fishers, trappers and the l ke, as well as the commercial companies. Following the resulting wars, came the treaties, which,
according to the authors, were negotiated too quickly and too often
by men who either failed to understand or failed to accommodate to
the fact and significance of the difference in the cultures of the parties
to the treaties. The history and explanation of the treaties does not
appear to be exhaustive, but suffices. The authors then review the
evolution of the policy of the federal government in treating the Indians. It may be summarized as an effort to integrate the Indian into
the white man's world by trying to make him a farmer and teaching
him the white man's ways and values in the white man's school. One
hardly requires the ensuing discussion and arguments made in the
book to conclude that ignoring the historical and cultural importance
of fishing to the Indians was error enough, but failing to appreciate
the commercial and. resource value of the fisheries and the potential
future conflicts was error enormous.
It is argued, and, in the truest sense advocated, that to the Indian,
fishing is not only an economic necessity, but a wholly indispensible
cultural and historic part of himself, his community and his heritage.
The authors repeatedly emphasize that Indians have a far different
concept of the land than does the white man:
1. In the Preface it is clearly stated that the book speaks principally for itself. Even
the "experts" recognize that they may not fully understand the position of the Indians
and may not properly articulate what they do understand.
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This is my land
From the time of the first moon
Till the time of the last sun
It was given to my people.
Wha-neh Wha-neh, the great giver of life
Made me out of the earth of this land
He said, "You are the land, and the land is you."
I take good care of the animals,
For they are my brothers and sisters.
I take care of the streams and rivers,
For they clean my land.
I honor Ocean as my father,
For he gives me food and a means of travel.
Ocean knows everything, for he is everywhere.
Ocean is wise, for he is old.
Listen to Ocean, for he speaks wisdom.
He sees much, and knows more.
He says, "Take care of my sister, Earth,
She is young and has little wisdom, but much kindness."
"When she smiles, it is springtime."
"Scar not her beauty, for she is beautiful beyond all things."
"Her face looks eternally upward to the beauty of sky and stars,
Where once she lived with her father, Sky."
I am forever grateful for this beautiful and bountiful earth.
God gave it to me
This is my land.
"This Is My Land"
Clarence Pickernell
Quinault, Taholah
The student of real property and real property law may be especially
interested in the concepts of ownership in common developed by the
Indians; the concepts of allotment of land to individuals pursued by
the Government; the concept of the United States taking the land,
alloting some and declaring the "surplus" salable to the United States;
and the concept of trusteeship developed by the Government. The
student of administrative law and activity may be most interested in
the review of the passage of various "Indian Acts" and creation of
various agencies to deal with the problems which arose and developed. 2
The legal scholar should direct his concern to the severe problems
caused by confusing decisions of some courts on the fishing rights
2. See Indian General Allotment Act,
381 (1887); Puyallup Allotment Act, 27
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1934). Representative
Board of Indian Commissioners and the

25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 336, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349,
Stat. 633 (1893); Indian Reorganization Act, 25
bodies are The Bureau of Indian Affairs, The
Indian Claims Commission.
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question, both on and off reservation rights.3 The section of the book
discussing "Indian fishing law" leads one to conclude that no lawyer,
let alone a layman Indian, can hope to arrive at a precise understanding of the present law, or advise of likely future development.
In attempting to focus the state of the problem as it currently (from
1950) exists, the authors briefly review the violence and demonstrations of 1965-1966, and the further judicial efforts to clarify the situation.4 They set forth what they understand to be the viewpoints of
the Indians, the sport fishermen, commercial fishermen, the states, the
federal agencies, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. They proffer some
impressive statistics, which, if sufficiently complete and accurate,
strongly suggest that the percentage of fish caught by Indians is almost
uniformly lower than the fish catch of sport fishermen and greatly less
than that of non-Indian commercial fishermen. Only one with expertise in this area would be able to evaluate the statistics and the
accuracy of the portrayal of the positions of the various interests;
however, they appear to be objective on their face, and they clearly
manifest a desire by each interest to advance and protect itself and
its position with little or no concern for the needs, demands or point
of view of any other interest.
The book's section explaining the biological interrelation of the
fish and their environment calls attention to still other commercial
interests involved in the controversy: dam builders who block the
salmon's access to spawning grounds; road builders who alter river
courses and fill the rivers; loggers who dam and fill and pollute; gravel
takers who destroy spawning areas; and land developers who do it all.
The impact of the problems discussed in this section transcends the
interests of the Indians and has its effect on the nation as a whole.
3. See The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (miscited in the
book as 39 U.S. 1); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (miscited in the book
as 147 U.S. 553 (1903)); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968);
Journeycake v. The Cherokee Nation, 28 Ct. Cl. 281 (1893), afJ'd, 155 U.S. 196 (1894);
Tulee v. State of Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); The Puyallup Tribe v. Department
of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Maison v. Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 829 (1963);
and Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Ore. 1969). (As may be observed in these
footnotes, some citations in the book are apparently incomplete, ..nd in some cases incorrect. The reader is cautioned to verify any citation upon which he may rely.)
4. See State of Washington v. Moses, 70 Wash. 2d 282, 422 P.2d 775, cert. denied,
389 U.S. 428 (1967), reh. denied, 390 U.S. 930 (1968) (miscited in the book as State v.
Robert Moses); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
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Destruction of fish is both an impairment of fish-dependent commerce
and the elimination of a national source of food.
In its final chapter, the book again offers the conclusion that the
controversy, albeit one of conservation and economics in part, is very
much one of failure to accommodate to real difference in the culture
and attitudes of the white men and the Indians.
In the Introduction to the book the authors invited consideration
of approaching the problems of conservation with fuller utilization
of existing assets such as Indians to conserve and develop the forests
and fisheries which are their homes and habitats. In the Conclusion,
the authors propose the formulation of a body (commission, if you
will) of persons truly and objectively representing the groups, communities, and interests involved in the controversy, and empowering it
to make equitable allocation of the fish, and to coordinate collateral
efforts of other bodies. The authors acknowledge the enormity and
uncertain outcome of such an effort, but suggest that a major segment
of our resources and perhaps our national values and standards are
imperiled if a successful approach and solution is not soon found.
According due recognition to the value of the facts, statistics, insights and thoughtful analyses found in Uncommon Controversy, it
is submitted that its most far reaching value and impact may follow
a consideration of its suggestion that the ultimate answers to the controversy will attend our view of actual differences existing between
the interests of the majority and a minority. As suggested, the resolution of the uncommon controversy may well be a microcosmic preview of our approach to and resolution of other massive domestic and
foreign policy problems and polemics.
From reading this book one should achieve a better understanding
of the essential problems and attitudes which render it so difficult to
resolve and compromise the competing claims and interests involved
with those who fish for salmon and use the rivers of our Northwest
Coast. One must also question his own values, and ask what sacrifice
he would be prepared to make to resolve a dispute between himself
and a weaker person, each laying claim to a valuable and personally
vital asset; what status he is truly prepared to concede to the diverse
views and values of others who are perhaps weaker than himself, and
whose views and values are very different from, and contradictory to,
his own; and, how deeply he is truly committed to the cause of liberty
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and justice espoused by his country, and the cause of love and selflessness espoused by his religious and ethical persuasion.
-uncommon controversy-uncommon challengeG. Daniel Carney*
READY FOR THE DEFENSE.

By Martin Garbus.t New York:

Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1971. Pp. xiii, 306. $7.95.
Marty Garbus has written five profiles of legal cases in which he has
participated as a young, well-equipped advocate. He has combined
them in this book which should especially attract the attention and
interest of the many young lawyers, law students, and applicants for
law school who are impelled by good conscience to turn to the pro
bono publico opportunities available in the practice and use of law.
It SuuIA
als attract awider audience comprising those who
inter11
aL
s g__
h are itr
ested in whether social change in civil rights or civil liberties can be
accomplished "within the system."
This book well depicts the day-to-day uncertainty and agony of that
struggle.
Two of the five profiles are outstanding-the case of Mrs. Sylvester
Smith, the Alabama welfare recipient whose children were denied
subsistence because a man had "visited" her; and the cruelly typical
Mississippi state court trial in which Mrs. Henrietta Wright, a black
person who had sought to register to vote, asked damages from arresting officers and doctors for physical beatings and wrongful commitment
to an asylum administered by them immediately after her voter registration.
Garbus is indeed moving in his recital of Mrs. Smith's case, the first
welfare system case to reach the United States Supreme Court. Especially interesting is his report of the preparation for argument, and
then the argument, before the Court. Here the writing is somewhat
reminiscent of the classic, Anthony Lewis' Gideon's Trumpet. The
agony of the welfare struggle occurs here, as is again and again tragically usual, when after a significant 9-0 victory in the Supreme Court,
Mrs. Smith continues to "get the run-around" from the Alabama state
authorities. (But it was estimated by HEW some six months after the
J.D. Northwestern University School of Law, 1962; Member of the Bar of Pennsylvania.
Co-Director of the Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law at Columbia Univert
sity.
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decision that approximately 750,000 children were receiving benefits
as a result of the Smith case.)
Retelling Mrs. Wright's Mississippi case, the author reveals unusual
sensitivity respecting the individuality of the persons in court-the
judge, the jurors, the witnesses, the tipstaves, the hangers-on-which
may remind the reader of James Gould Cozzens' The just and the
Unjust, an outstanding novel on a court trial.
One might ask more of the other three profiles: In The People against
Lenny Bruce, Garbus was participating counsel with the First Amendment eminence, Ephraim London. Those who know the case, or London's expertise in the freedom of speech and press, will wish that more
of London's contribution to the theory and handling of the case had
been included. Another profile concerns two cases involving Manfredo
Correa and Frederick Charles Wood, and raises the question of capital
punishment as vividly and effectively as almost any writing except
perhaps Camus, or Judge Curtis Bok's Star Wormwood. However, this
reviewer must discount the usefulness or interest of any report on
capital punishment released in 1971 which does not refer to the recent
Supreme Court cases, or to the efforts of the NAACP Legal Defense
Committee and Professor Anthony Amsterdam of Stanford University
Law School, and many others respecting the more than 650 men held
in death-rows today. Finally, the profile concerning The People against
Timothy Leary is insignificant (except as it relates a stupid and uncomprehending police bust and search) and appears to be mere namedropping. These criticisms aside, I do recommend Marty Garbus' book,
and, especially, that part on Mrs. Sylvester Smith's case. That one
chapter should have been, or should be, separately published, perhaps
in a periodical, to receive widest circulation.
The book is exceptionally well written. The reading is easy. Again,
it is especially recommended to all those interested in increasing employment of litigation and law for social purposes. Here is splendid
"autumn reading" about law directed to aid minorities, the misunderstood, and the poor. (When winter comes and more solid fare seems
indicated, a recent classic, Norman Dorsen's Frontiers of Civil Liberties, published in 1968, should be taken from the shelf or library for
a deeper look at the same area.)
Thomas M. Kerr*
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law; Lecturer in Industrial Administration and Law, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, CarnegieMellon University.
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